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“Top Secret—Classified—For The Board—The 
Elite—The Initiates— ”        
 Are these the words of the all-powerful 
boards and syndicates of the earth? These are 
the words of liars cowards collaborators 
traitors. Liars who want time for more lies. 
Cowards who can not face your “dogs” your 
“gooks” your “errand boys” your “human 
animals” with the truth.      
           
       (Nova Express, 2) 
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1. Introduction 
I. Why Burroughs, Why Now? 
The focus of this thesis is on a mysterious group of beings encountered 
in William S. Burroughs’ (1914-1997) literary works: the Wild Boys. 
These Wild Boys are a personification of many of the central themes of 
Burroughs’ works, such as homosexuality, masculinity and violence, but 
also revolution, anarchism and utopianism. As embodiments of all the 
above themes, the Wild Boys offer much that is of interest in the present 
day political sphere because they exist as (and express) a reaction to 
some of the dominant ideological and social conflicts of Burroughs’ time. 
The structure of these conflicts may have changed but they have 
certainly not disappeared: family structures, masculinity and femininity, 
the capitalist economic paradigm, pacifism contra revolutionary desires 
and, last but by no means least, the relation of the West to ‘the rest,’ and 
in relation to this, American imperialism and its 20th century crises. 
Through the Wild Boys, Burroughs outlines an alternative form of social 
organisation which has its own internal contradictions and pitfalls, but 
which is ultimately concerned with possibilities of radical emancipation. 
In The Wild Boys (1971), the novel which is named after them, we read a 
description of a fictitious American general’s speech: 
 
Camera shows the CIA man, a tape recorder slung around his 
neck rests on his paunch. Naked youths flash on screen 
smoking hashish...  
“You may say that what happens in a foreign land is no 
concern of ours. But the vile tentacles of that evil are 
reaching into decent American homes” ... Suburban couple in 
the boy’s room school banners on the wall. They are reading 
a note 
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Dear Mom and Dad: 
I am going to join the wild boys. When you read this 
I will be far away. 
 
“All over America kids like Johnny are deserting this country 
and their great American heritage suborned by the false 
promises of Moscow into a life of drugs and vice.”   
          
 (The Wild Boys, 123) 
 
This extract appears to us mostly as satire or parody of typical American 
Cold War rhetoric. Beyond that simple observation, however, we see that 
the speaker, General Greenfield, explicitly associates the Wild Boy 
movement with Moscow and the Soviet Union. We learn from context 
around this extract, however, that the Wild Boys have no such affinity. 
They can be found anywhere in the world. In another novel featuring 
Wild Boys, Port of Saints (1980), Burroughs describes this as follows:  
 
There are about thirty boys here of all races and nationalities: 
Negroes, Chinese, Mexicans, Arabs, Danes, Swedes, 
Americans, English. That is, they are evidently derived from 
racial and national stock corresponding to Negroes, 
Mexicans, Danes, Americans et cetera. However, these boys 
are a new breed. (71) 
 
In other parts of the text we read about snake boys, glider boys, roller-
skate boys, cat boys and many more subdivisions of this strange 
collective. From mutation to bodily augmentation to simple costumes, the 
Wild Boys are varied, and they are mostly described in combat 
situations, wielding huge bowie knives and improvised weaponry. They 
appear as an avant-garde of a utopian future with one very peculiar and 
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controversial detail: the Wild Boys’ utopia contains no women. The 
suggestion made in Port of Saints but also in other novels is that 
masculinity can thrive only through the abandonment of femininity: “From 
that day to this the wild boys put all thought of women from their minds 
and bodies. Anyone who joins them must leave women behind.” (97) 
This is, perhaps, the most divisive element of Burroughs’ writing with 
regards to its political interpretations. The role of gender in Burroughs 
has been frequently discussed, even though for a long time it had been 
neglected somewhat. As an example of the increased attention that this 
important theme has received, Jamie Russel’s Queer Burroughs (2001) 
contains a powerful emphasis on the masculine/feminine opposition and 
on Burroughs’ representations of homosexuality, as the title of the work 
might suggest. Russel writes:  
 
Much of Burroughs’ literary output of the 1950s is 
characterized by the frustration and confusion that the 
negotiation of the demands of the effeminate paradigm 
produced. In comparison, the post-Stonewall novels center 
on a vision of a new, queer social order based on all-male 
(and all-gay) communes in which women and effeminate gay 
men have no place. (…) In place of the dystopian images of 
social regulation that informed Queer and Naked Lunch, 
Burroughs imagines a gay community that is not only free 
from regulation by the heterosexual dominant but also free 
from the gender schizophrenia imposed by the dominant. 
          (57-58) 
 
Precisely the second vision on gender is embodied by the Wild Boys. I 
would argue that this is a highly problematic element, but that it doesn’t 
invalidate a reading of the texts based on the idea of an emancipatory 
struggle. What is clear is that Burroughs took a polemic position in the 
field of gender; instead of calling for increased freedom, tolerance or 
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(civil) rights for homosexuals through his writing, his response is 
militaristic and based on a kind of exclusion.      
 A reading which focuses on the above themes is necessarily a 
political one, which begs the question: what are the elements of 
Burroughs’ works that motivate such a political reading? An important 
motive for this is the way in which Burroughs agitated against “control-
mechanisms” and the power of “the word” (or language) that the powerful 
use to remain in control, calling for individuals to overthrow these 
machinations in a manner which reminds one of the ideals of anarchism: 
self-governance and dissolution of the state to the extent that all 
institutional relations are voluntary instead of being imposed from the 
top-down. Burroughs’ fictional works contain plenty of cryptic calls to 
action, such as this line from The Soft Machine (1961), in which the 
concept of “reality” itself is challenged in the context of Uranium Willy’s 
plan:  
 
His plan called for total exposure – Wise up all the marks 
everywhere show them the rigged wheel – Storm the Reality 
Studio and retake the universe – The Plan shifted and 
reformed as reports came in from his electric patrols sniffing 
quivering down streets of the earth – the Reality Film giving 
and buckling like a bulk head under pressure – burnt metal 
smell of interplanetary war in the raw noon streets swept by 
screaming glass blizzards of enemy flak.    
       (144, The Soft Machine) 
 
The idea of a “reality studio” is remarkable, of course, because it 
suggests that reality itself is being produced somewhere by someone – it 
is therefore artificial. Much poststructuralist thought of the 1970’s and 
80’s also considers reality to be artificial, or constructed, the difference 
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being that Burroughs’ characters appear to be quite ready and willing to 
“storm the Reality Studio” and to destroy this process in order to return to 
some pre-artificial or natural state, which in poststructuralist theory would 
usually be considered to be impossible.      
 The bloody age of colonialism has mostly come to an end, with 
present day struggles of hegemony taking on a much less overtly 
colonialist form; the place of homosexuality in the United States is much 
less confined than it was in Burroughs’ time and the open racism of 
American politics of the 1950’s and ‘60s would not be accepted in the 
same way nowadays. However, since the financial, economic (and other) 
crisis that erupted in 2007, now often called “The Great Recession” in 
reference to the Great Depression of 1929 which Burroughs himself 
wrote about too, something has become increasingly tangible: the 
“Reality Studio” has been sputtering and struggling to produce a 
coherent reality of the kind that was previously anchored in the dream of 
a global capitalism. The guarantor of this dream was once the United 
States itself, and the economic and military dominance that emanated 
from it. The order of global capitalism remains in trouble, but not the kind 
of trouble Burroughs continuously depicts in his works, namely that of an 
uprising of (usually masculine) youth intent on breaking free from a 
manufactured reality. Instead, it seems, all kinds of different groups are 
stirring simultaneously, but none is quite capable of challenging the 
“systems of control” to a breaking point. It is interesting, however, to 
observe the tension that has become more visible in the field of facts, or 
the reporting of truth, since the controversial election of Donald Trump as 
president of the United States of America in 2016: perhaps the Reality 
Studio is experiencing some inner troubles, instead of being stormed 
from the outside as Uranium Willy proposes. Burroughs’ peculiar 
conception of a Reality Studio can be interpreted simply as a figurative 
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“place” in which the views, sounds and other sensory experiences of our 
lives are somehow scripted and manufactured similarly to a movie, but it 
can also be thought of as the location where our society’s ideologies are 
constantly produced and perpetuated. In that last interpretation, 
institutions such as the press, public and private education, religious and 
social organisations et cetera would be the constituent parts making up 
the studio. The way in which one chooses to interpret this Reality Studio,  
the object of much of the resistance of Burroughs’ protagonists and the 
Wild Boys, determines also the possible interpretations one can give of 
the place of resistance within Burroughs’ texts. I will be using the above 
interpretation which defines the Reality Studio as an enormous 
interconnected field of the production and maintenance of ideology, 
which also implies that if such a large construct would be “stormed” as 
Uranium Willy calls for, the changes brought about could be 
inconceivably large. In other words, I identify the resistance within 
Burroughs’ novels as being relatively radical; he is not suggesting minor 
adjustments to the way things are.      
 In the second chapter, I revisit the cut-up method in Burroughs by 
exploring it in relation to early 20th-century Dadaist avant-garde writings 
that constitute earlier articulations of this method. I hypothesize that 
Burroughs’ usage of the cut-up, which involves cutting-up texts and 
rearranging them into new composite forms, gives his novels a prophetic 
quality which can be found in these 20th century Dadaist avant-garde 
writings as well. Also taking into account that the concept of barbarism 
was central to this older avant-garde art, elucidating the function of 
barbarism in Dadaism will help me show how this concept can be 
productive in approaching the cut-up in Burroughs’ work.  The following 
chapter will expand on this idea.  
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The third chapter of this thesis is fully dedicated to the concept of 
barbarism in relation to culture, literature and more specifically to 
Burroughs’ cut-up works. Here, the concept of barbarism allows me to 
establish an interpretative framework for his cut-up literature. This 
concept certainly serves well in describing exactly what happens to the 
process of meaning-production when literature is made into cut-up 
literature. My use of barbarism as a framework for approaching the cut-
up will be intertwined with my exploration of barbarian figures within 
Burroughs’ work, particularly in the form of the Wild Boys. The Wild 
Boys, as I will show, emulate in a certain way the ‘barbaric’ function of 
the cut-up itself in Burroughs. By exploring barbarism both as an 
interpretive framework for studying the cut-up and as figure with a central 
function in Burroughs’ works, I hope to show why barbarism can be a 
productive concept for new readings of Burroughs.  
 
2. The Cut-up... 
II. Postmodernism or Avant-Gardism? 
To introduce to any reader the concept of the cut-up as propagated by 
20th century literary authors and artists such as Burroughs and his most 
consistent collaborator Brion Gysin (1916-1986), it seems necessary to 
activate a kind of textual awareness in myself and my reader that other 
literature doesn’t require. I am not saying they require a “deeper” or a 
“superior” textual awareness, but a distinctly different one. Whenever I 
attempt to put into words the affective operations that cut-up literature 
introduces into the reading process, I struggle, unless I allow myself the 
leeway of relaxing my writing style, sometimes even incorporating cut-up 
practices into the theoretical reflections that I write. It is in self-reflexive 
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works such as The Third Mind (1978), in which Gysin and Burroughs use 
cut-ups to reflect upon the process of cutting-up, that one can see this 
idea taken to extremes. That text performs the cut-up, and in doing so, 
offers us an investigation into the cut-up. Is it not, after all, counter-
intuitive and even hypocritical to write in a rigid and prefigured way about 
artworks and literature that seeks precisely to question a rigid and 
prescribed way of writing?         
 One of the aims of this thesis is to explore the possible ways in 
which one can theorize cut-ups in academic language. I would suggest 
that this kind of academic writing is a continuous exercise of 
appropriation that is perhaps best explained by the mechanism of 
Jacques Lacan’s notion of “university discourse,” by which Lacan 
designates an academic practice that is all too eager to appropriate and 
domesticate what we could call the radical element(s) in its object of 
study. In a short text called Jacques Lacan’s Four Discourses (2006), 
Slavoj Žižek explains this:  
 
Although Lacan's notion of "university discourse" circulates 
widely today, it is seldom used in its precise meaning 
(designating a specific "discourse," social link). As a rule, it 
functions as a vague notion of some speech being part of the 
academic interpretive machinery. In contrast to this use, one 
should always bear in mind that, for Lacan, university 
discourse is not directly linked to the university as a social 
institution-for example, he states that the Soviet Union was 
the pure reign of university discourse. Consequently, not only 
does the fact of being turned into an object of the university 
interpretive machinery prove nothing about one's discursive 
status -names like Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, or Benjamin, all 
three great antiuniversitarians whose presence in the 
academy is today all-pervasive-demonstrate that the 
"excluded" or "damned" authors are the IDEAL feeding stuff 
for the academic machine. Can the upper level of Lacan's 
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formula of the university discourse - S21 directed toward a2 - 
not also be read as standing for the university knowledge 
endeavoring to integrate, domesticate, and appropriate the 
excess that resists and rejects it? (1) 
 
This is an important idea to keep in mind in many (academic) situations, 
but especially in the study of art, which often seems to be studied 
particularly for its surprising, outstanding, excessive elements. It is 
deceivingly difficult, perhaps impossible, to resist the temptation of such 
appropriation, but it might be feasible to operate with it in the forefront of 
one’s mind, as I will try to do.      
 What do I mean when I speak of cut-up literature or of the literary 
cut-up? In material terms, cut-up literature is simply the result of 
rearranging cut-up remnants of previously extant texts. Cut-ups 
themselves, however, are not without symbolic significance; to make cut-
up literature foregrounds that you are destroying something in the 
process of creating something, similar to the agricultural process—
sometimes mentioned in Burroughs’ works—of “slash-and-burn” farming, 
which consists of creating fertile ground for crops by cutting down and 
burning previous flora. Burroughs once said in an interview:  
 
I think that the novelistic form is probably outmoded and that 
we may look forward perhaps to a future in which people do 
not read at all or read only illustrated books and magazines 
or some abbreviated form of reading matter. To compete with 
television and photo magazines writers will have to develop 
more precise techniques producing the same effect on the 
reader as a lurid action photo. (Odier, 27) 
                                                          
1 Knowledge 
2 Objet Petit a 
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The creation of the form of the cut-up novel necessitates a symbolic 
destruction of the older forms of the novel. This allows an evocative 
question: are today’s novels, insofar as they belong to this form that has 
been symbolically “slashed and burned” to give rise to the cut-up novel 
not, in some way, (un)dead? This question is of course a rather 
problematic one, seeing as these symbolically destroyed forms of novel 
are still being written and read more than 50 years later. And the novels 
we read nowadays are still distinguishable from "lurid action photos", 
which implies that no true destruction has taken place. Literature, on the 
whole, is no longer a place of breaking with tradition in the Modernist 
sense. And yet, in the context of this thesis, I will take the statement 
seriously, if only because it gives rise to the following question: Why was 
the novelistic form becoming outmoded, according to Burroughs? 
 One of the main things that sets Burroughs’ works apart from other 
(experimental) literature is their incorporation of the avant-gardist 
principle of the collage. By containing cut-up parts of pre-existing texts, 
rearranged into new forms, Burroughs’ texts invest heavily in the element 
of surprise at the syntactical level, as the following little example will 
hopefully illustrate: “The Ovens smell of simple facts of the case and i 
guess won’t be much left – little time, parasites – Now we see all the 
pictures -” (113, The Soft Machine). The reader gets no respite from the 
relentless pace of the language and may find it hard to slow down and 
reflect on exactly what is read. The constant hope is that the next 
sentence will offer some clarification. It is precisely the cut-up element 
that allows his texts to metaphorically resemble lurid action-photos as 
opposed to, say, carefully choreographed portrait-photography or 
landscape photography. These two other kinds of photography might 
better serve as metaphors for other types of literature, such as literature 
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that is interested in offering in-depth psychological portraits of 
characters, or literature that spares no expenses in the description of 
characters’ surroundings, respectively.      
 Whenever I read critiques of Burroughs’ works that present them 
as a prefiguring of postmodernism, or even an embodiment of it, I am 
struck by what is left out by such a categorization. In Shift Linguals: Cut-
up Narratives from Burroughs to the Present (2011), Edward S. 
Robinson touches upon this: 
 
However, numerous other critics, including Frederic 
Jameson in his essay “Postmodernism and the Consumer 
Society”, cite Burroughs as an early exponent of 
postmodernism, and identify the cut-ups as exemplifying 
postmodern literary practices. (...) Burroughs aligned himself 
with the avant-garde, but it should be borne in mind that the 
formalisation of the cut-up method predates the coining of the 
term postmodern. As such (...) Burrough’s work can be seen 
to exemplify postmodernism before a theoretical framework 
was constructed to accommodate such modes of literature. 
As I will demonstrate, there are elements of the cut-ups that 
could be considered to belong to both postmodern and avant-
garde frameworks. (Robinson, 5) 
 
Robinson’s observation appears to be accurate, in so far as it allows us 
to think of the cut-ups as (at least) two-natured. But a problem arises if 
we read the cut-ups as a synthesis between avant-garde and a kind of 
pre-theoretical postmodernism, namely, what is the difference between 
the two? In order to answer this question, it seems necessary to first 
examine the origins of postmodernism, which are bound up with the 
histories of both modernism and historical avant-gardism.  
 If there is a well-known distinction between Modernist art and 
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works by the historical avant-garde, it is that the avant-gardists 
emphasized in their works the ways in which art was a part of society, as 
opposed to a higher occupation that transcends society and its concerns. 
This latter position is the one commonly attributed to Modernist 
endeavours. The implicit denial of art’s social character allowed 
Modernist art critique to maintain an arbitrary separation between high 
and low art, pop-culture and Culture. If one investigates avant-gardist art, 
does one not notice themes of everyday life, often confronting but 
nevertheless recognizable to many? Futurists and their warfare, 
transportation, industrialisation; Dadaists with their ready-mades, such 
as Duchamp’s famous urinal, Fountain (1917), displayed in the same 
way as a sculpture would be, or Surrealists with their fascination for the 
dream-world that even those who are not initiated into the arts know all 
too well. And on the other hand, in Modernist art, does one not see 
clearly a fascination with the so-called purity of Art, in which each art 
form defines itself by its supposed essential characteristic such as the 
texture obsession of High Modernist abstract art or the focus on narrative 
that is still used to define literature to this day?    
 I am not interested in constructing an art-ideology that 
unproblematically equates Modernist ideals with avant-gardist ones, 
reducing the respective poles to “fast friends”. Traces of both sets of 
ideals exist in the cut-up literature of William S. Burroughs, but neither 
category is a perfect fit for this literature. The cut-up works contain both 
the Modernist desires for purity of Art and telos or purpose, albeit 
obscurely, and the avant-gardist “tradition” of anti-tradition. A statement 
Burroughs often used is “life is a cut-up”, implying that to represent the 
world as-it-is in writing, one must necessarily utilize cut-up text. In this, 
we can locate the epistemological obsession of modernist literature. 
Think, for example, of the well-known “stream-of-consciousness” 
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technique employed by Joyce, Eliot, Woolf and numerous others, 
designed as a technique which would allow a more accurate 
representation of one’s experiences of the world. This technique plays a 
significant role in many of Burroughs’ cut-ups, occurring often in an 
“impure” form, rarely obvious, as in this extract from The Soft Machine:
   
      
Old junky street-cleaners push little red wagons 
sweeping up condoms and empty H caps, KY tubes, broken 
trusses and sex devices, keif garbage and confetti, mouldy 
jockstraps and bloody Kotex, shit-stained color comics, dead 
kitten and afterbirths, jenshe babies of berdache and junkie.
 Everywhere the soft insidious voice of the pitchman 
delayed action language lesson muttering under all your 
pillows ‘Shows all kinds of masturbation and self-abuse. 
Young boys need it special.’ faded sepia genitals in the 
drawer of a tattoo parlor... silver paper in the wind... frayed 
sounds of a distant city. (93) 
 
This play with the reader’s perception takes full advantage of the effects 
of the stream-of-consciousness technique, perhaps leading to different 
results, but nonetheless projecting onto our mind a stream of images that 
together set the scene, as it were, of an otherwise undisclosed location. 
These are some of the most obvious incorporations of Modernist 
technique in Burroughs’ works, which (ab)use Modernist “tricks”, as it 
were, to elicit an affective response from the reader; here arguably one 
of disgust, as we seem to find ourselves in a dystopian scene.  
 Burroughs’ cut-up texts are two-voiced, because they contain the 
foundational elements of both Modernist and avant-gardist art ideals: 
Modernist because they perform the act of representation in a manner 
that is vying for a kind of authenticity of representation, exemplified by 
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the statement “life is a cut-up”, continuing the pursuit of a kind of 
representational purity that once led early Modernist authors away from 
the mode of Realism itself: if life is a cut-up, it can only be accurately 
represented in literature through the cut-up. And yet, they are avant-
gardist because they reiterate this modernist telos in a way that defies 
much of the tradition that it originated in, and because they often 
abandon the pursuit of the representation of perception, a central 
element of Modernist art, and instead present unperceivable scenes in a 
framework of the perceptible. They are three-voiced, even, if one 
considers the postmodernist voice to be a departure from the modernist 
one that does not coincide with the ways in which avant-garde departs 
from it.          
 Throughout the decades that are often labelled as the ‘postmodern’ 
era, roughly the latter half of the 20th century up to the present day, a 
great number of experimental novels have been written, liberated from a 
lot of the burdens that narrativity carries within itself, but not necessarily 
free of narrativity as a whole. This characteristic, narrativity, has had an 
anchoring function throughout history. But, as Ernst van Alphen explains, 
this function has faded: “First of all, postmodernism displays a disbelief in 
what has traditionally been seen as one of the main functions of 
narrative. Narrative is no longer able to legitimize the meaning of life, of 
our place in the world” (van Alphen, 483). Without its traditional 
significance as a tool which anchors our reality, the function of narrative 
has changed: postmodernist literature uses narrativity to question our 
relation to reality rather than legitimize or anchor it. This is one of the 
chief reasons why Burroughs’ works could be called postmodernist. Very 
rarely do they present a stable narrative; more often than not they 
pretend to contain one, only to let it disintegrate, often through use of 
cut-up, and end up producing the “ontological uncertainty” that is so 
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typical for (this interpretation of) postmodernism in literature.  
 When van Alphen states that “the legitimizing function of narrative 
seems to have been confining rather than liberating” (483), he is referring 
to the fact that narrativity has made a return since the early days of 
postmodernism in which it was heavily critiqued and fell out of favour, 
exactly because it lost the legitimizing function that once confined it. This 
return undoubtedly came as a surprise to many of those that witnessed 
this period first-hand, and especially those who embraced it fully. The 
results of this postmodernist critique of narrativity, the dismantling of the 
traditional values associated with narrativity, has liberated it from a lot of 
its traditional responsibilities, but it has simultaneously compromised 
literature’s potential as a tool of resistance. And arguably, the nature of 
postmodernist critique has even eased narrativity’s return into a late-
capitalist society, removing much of the former’s dangerous potential in 
the process. Authors that today operate within a postmodern world can 
choose to write in a realist, modernist, postmodernist or any other mode 
they desire, but I would argue that this choice cannot be quite as 
revolutionary as it might have been in the past. The bomb has been 
defused before being planted, so to say. To use a line from Gregory 
Corso’s poem The Bomb (1958): “Not up to man whether you boom or 
not.” (1) In the previous era, such “bombs” were still imaginable. An 
author could explode the traditional function of narrativity, shocking the 
literary establishment, to make something new. Fredric Jameson’s 
famous critique of postmodernism in Postmodernism, or the Cultural 
Logic of Late Capitalism (1991) contains a description of this major 
change that occurred in our conception of history in the transition from 
modernism into postmodernism, which might further clarify my above 
metaphor of the bomb: 
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For I take it as axiomatic that "modernist history" is the first 
casualty and mysterious absence of the Postmodernism 
period (...) in art, at least, the notion of progress and telos 
remained alive and well up to very recent times indeed, in its 
most authentic, least stupid and caricatural, form, in which 
each genuinely new work unexpectedly but logically 
outtrumped its predecessor (not "linear history" this, but 
rather Shklovsky's "knight's gambit;" the action at distance, 
the quantum leap to the undeveloped or underdeveloped 
square). Dialectical history, to be sure, affirmed that all 
history worked this way, on its left foot, as it were, 
progressing, as Henri Lefebvre once put it, by way of 
catastrophe and disaster; but fewer ears heard that than 
believed the modernist aesthetic paradigm, which was on the 
point of being confirmed as a virtual religious doxa when it 
unexpectedly vanished without a trace. (F. Jameson, ix) 
 
Postmodernism is described as something that came unexpectedly to 
replace modernism, banishing idea(l)s of progress and telos into the 
margins. From my perspective, any definition of modernism or 
postmodernism should take their respective contexts into account. They 
are not just styles or genres, but rather paradigmatic structures that were 
driven by (or even defined by) a desire to adapt not only art but human 
experience at large to its fast-changing surroundings. In this sense, even 
the postmodernist aesthetic has a type of future-bound orientation, but it 
lacks a clear destination, a theoretical moment at which it comes to a 
stop, which for Modernist art would be something like “pure Art”. This 
description, although it is somewhat too general, makes more sense 
when we agree on a historical context for both modernism and 
postmodernism, the one roughly existing as paradigm between 1900 and 
1950 and the other, for simplicity’s sake, from 1950 up to the recent past, 
or arguably, up to now. In many ways, the modernist aesthetic ideology 
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lives on to this day, not as purely paradigmatic, but nevertheless highly 
relevant. It is important to consider here the history of the second World 
War and its most traumatic aspect, the Holocaust, which has fuelled the 
critiques of the ideology of purity that ended the dominance of the 
Modernist tradition in the art-discourse unlike any other event. 
 Modernism and post-modernism do not exist purely in opposition to 
one another, even though postmodernism appears as a radical departure 
from modernism in the way Jameson proposes. If the change from 
modernism to postmodernism is defined by an abandonment of the 
teleological thought that underpinned the modernist aesthetic paradigm, 
this implies that one of the defining characteristics of postmodernism is 
its abandonment of ideas of progress or telos, an alteration, in other 
words, of one’s position in relation to the future. This is a well-known 
aspect of post-modernity, in which the “grand narratives” have all but lost 
their end-goal or telos, even if, again, they still present some future-
bound orientation. They are still means, but no longer means to stable 
ends. This is often considered to be the situation of the “radical” Left in 
politics, nowadays. After all, what stable vision of the future remains 
when all attempts at socialist states seem to bring about tragedy and, in 
the end an energetic, if authoritarian, reversal to capitalism, as one could 
say of present-day China or Russia. The emancipatory politics 
engendered by Marxist theory, therefore, are no less means than before, 
but the ends they serve have been drained of the transcendent force 
they once possessed. This interpretation of postmodernism is far from 
new (or revolutionary), but it is a necessary one to understand the 
disappearance of avant-gardism, at least in the revolutionary form it took 
some 100 years ago, which was so engaged with the future that it sought 
to break the past, in breaking with tradition. In Burroughs’ works, 
however, we find remnants of this avant-gardism, especially in the parts 
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of his texts that deal with the Wild Boys and their struggles against what 
is constantly described as a coherent but multi-faced dominant culture of 
strongly prescribed gender roles, family structures and lifestyles: “Who 
are these boys? Where will they go? They will become astronauts 
playing the part of American married idiots until the moment when they 
take off on a Gemini expedition bound for Mars, disconnect and leave 
the earth behind forever” (83, The Wild Boys) The revolutionary theme of 
leaving behind the earth, language, religion, and most importantly the 
body, recurs throughout Burroughs’ works.      
 In The Search for Tradition: Avant-Garde and Postmodernism in 
the 1970s (1981), Andreas Huyssen questions why in the late 1970’s, 
arguably when postmodernism was at its most dominant, there was a 
remarkable rebirth of interest in the historical avant-garde. This avant-
garde, consisting most famously of the Dadaïsts, Constructivists, 
Futurists, Surrealists and quite a few others, seemed to have lost all its 
radical momentum in the time of World War II. The groups that made up 
the historical avant-garde can be identified by their chief goal: the 
breaking of the powers of tradition over Art and society, and the breaking 
of the arbitrary separation of Art and society. It is fascinating to witness, 
as Huyssen does, how in the late 1970’s, a time of post-modernism, 
there is a real urge in the art world to re-embrace the historical avant-
garde as a tradition of sorts. Part of the problem is, according to 
Huyssen, that in the US the historical avant-garde has often been 
confused and conflated with modernism, however unintuitive this might 
appear from a perspective of European art-studies. The telling difference 
between the two, I would argue, that while the avant-gardists sought to 
question art’s separation from society, many modernists held much more 
traditional ideals of high art. Huyssen therefore rethinks the relation 
between the historical avant-garde and postmodernist art, noting the 
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possibility that the European avant-garde of the early 20th century finds 
its logical continuation in the American counter-culture of the 1960’s: 
“From the perspective of today, US art of the 1960s -precisely because 
of its successful attack on abstract expressionism- shines as the colorful 
death mask of a classical avant-garde which in Europe already had been 
liquidated culturally and politically by Stalin and Hitler” (Huyssen, 31). In 
this operation, Huyssen rearranges the parts that usually make up the 
narrative of the historical relations between the avant-garde, modernism 
and postmodernism. Most importantly, he argues that postmodernism 
can be seen as the “endgame of avant-garde”, and thus “not the radical 
break it often claimed to be.” Huyssen considers what the well-known 
theorist of the avant-garde, Walter Benjamin, might’ve experienced if he 
had encountered the re-exposed avant-gardist art of the 1970’s:  
 
(...) would he simply have argued that the administered 
culture of late capitalism had finally succeeded in imposing 
the phony spell of commodity fetishism even on that art which 
more than any other had challenged the values and traditions 
of bourgeois culture? Maybe after another penetrating gaze 
at that architectural monument to wholesale technological 
progression the heart of Paris, Benjamin would have quoted 
himself: "In every era the attempt must be made to wrest 
tradition away from a conformism that is about to overpower 
it." Thus might he acknowledge not only that the avant-garde 
embodiment of anti-tradition has itself become tradition, but, 
moreover, that its inventions and its imagination have 
become integral even to Western culture's most official 
manifestations. (A. Huyssen, 23) 
 
The important question raised here is whether “anti-tradition has itself 
become tradition”, and if so, whether that tradition has a breaking point 
that remains somehow obscured by this reasoning. If the avant-garde 
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has itself become tradition (and safely historical), does that mean that its 
forcefulness, its affective quality, can no longer be produced in the 
present? I believe it can, even though some channels have been barred 
by the integration of avant-gardist principles into “Western culture’s most 
official manifestations.” The cut-up, even though it is a tool available 
outside of literature as well, remains in the margins within literature on 
the whole, in the sense that cut-up text itself runs a serious risk of not 
being considered to be literary at all. It is unavoidably marginal also 
because the cut-up challenges the standard mode of reading and of 
interpretation that most literature requires. It is in this sense that 
Burroughs’ cut-up works can be considered still somewhat avant-gardist, 
even though they are part of some form of literary canon and of popular 
culture by now. If anything, Burroughs has not been quite assimilated 
into “Western culture’s most official manifestations” just yet, even though 
one could argue that they have found a place within a kind of literary 
canon of experimental literature.          
 Huyssen’s point is of great interest to Marxist critique, because it 
touches upon the ways in which emancipatory struggle itself is constantly 
in danger of losing its radical qualities by being incorporated into the 
capitalist system. Slavoj Žižek notes in a short text called On Alain 
Badiou and Logiques des mondes (2007): 
 
In pre-capitalist formations, every State, every re-
presentational totalization, implies a founding exclusion, a 
point of "symptomal torsion," a "part of no-part," an element 
which, although part of the system, did not have a proper 
place within it - and the emancipatory politics had to 
intervene from this excessive ("surnumerary") element 
which, although part of the situation, cannot be accounted for 
in its terms. However, what happens when the system no 
longer excludes the excess, but directly posits it as its driving 
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force - as is the case in capitalism which can only reproduce 
itself through its constant self-revolutionizing, through the 
constant overcoming of its own limit? To put it in a simplified 
way: if a political event, a revolutionary emancipatory 
intervention into a determinate historical world, is always 
linked to the excessive point of its "symptomal torsion," if it 
by definition undermines the contours of this world, how, 
then, are we to define the emancipatory political intervention 
into a universe which is already in itself world-less, which, for 
its reproduction, no longer needs to be contained by the 
constraints of a "world"? How are we to revolutionize an 
order whose very principle is constant self-revolutionizing? 
(2)         
    
Žižek points out, with the theoretical help of Lacan, how capitalism 
incorporates its own radical excess, i.e. (the place of) emancipatory 
politics. The concept of revolution, here called a “revolutionary 
emancipatory intervention”, once so central to any and all Marxist 
thought, is posited as a structurally integral element of capitalism itself, 
albeit perhaps without its radical quality, although even this element can 
sometimes be found in the tug-of-war between the two poles, the 
capitalist one and the one which “although part of the situation, cannot 
be accounted for in its terms”, the “surnumerary” radical Left. One of the 
relatively recent revolutions that is arguably interior to capitalism is the 
digital one, in which we can never be sure if networks like Facebook, 
Google or Twitter present us with radical emancipatory potential, as was 
often enunciated around the time of the Arab Spring (somewhat 
tragically, in retrospect), or whether they are something much more 
ambiguous.          
 Each of the formations discussed above, from avant-gardism to 
postmodernism, in a certain sense seem to exist in an antagonistic 
relation to capitalism. The avant-garde, although highly varied, was 
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influenced by Marxist theory and obsessed with a future world free of the 
industrialized warfare they witnessed. Modernism often made claims of 
high art, separated from everyday life, that cannot hold true in a world in 
which art is dominated by a culture industry of sorts, and thus the 
Modernist aesthetic ideal leads to a rather limited, specialized audience. 
Postmodernism’s relation to capitalism has already been touched upon. 
Jameson’s labelling of postmodernism as the cultural logic of late 
capitalism is a labelling that few postmodernists would embrace with 
glee. To this extent, all three of these major positions on art share an 
element of resistance to being capitalized upon by cultural industry as 
such, but all three can play the role of a “cultural logic of late capitalism.”
 As Huyssen pointed out, the counter-culture of the 60’s can very 
effectively be interpreted as a continuation of the historical avant-garde 
that died out in Europe around the time of World War II, if not earlier. 
Burroughs’ cut-up works are an important element of this counter-culture, 
as was much of the work of his friends and acquaintances of the Beat-
generation, leading me to conclude that, of all the available 
categorizations, avant-garde is probably the most rewarding framework 
for an interpretation of Burroughs, and the one that also holds the most 
radical emancipatory potential. The important question is whether 
Burroughs’ work can be/has been assimilated into the capitalist 
superstructure and is therefore “defused” together with the rest of the 
avant-garde, according to Huyssen’s argument. I claim, optimistically, 
that there is still an element in the works that is unaccounted for (and 
which may be unaccountable for), and that element is and has always 
been the cut-up itself, which is still utterly marginal in our present-day 
society. It appears to me as one of the artistic operations that is most 
resistant to being integrated completely into a liberal and ultimately 
capitalist art-discourse, because it defies narrative conventions and 
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realist representational methods, and in some ways it even defies 
interpretation altogether. It is no wonder that many people to this day, 
when Burroughs comes up in conversation, ask questions along the lines 
of: what is the place of originality or creativity in cut-up works? What is 
the role of the author in this process? Is he/she who cuts up other texts 
and rearranges them truly an author? In short, the cut-up works often 
raise the typical questions that much literary theory at some point has 
had to deal with. In What Is An Author? (1969), Michel Foucault’s well 
known text (which was transcribed from a lecture) about the role of the 
author and the authorial figure’s relation of privilege and power over  
interpretations of their work, we read the following: “In writing, the point is 
not to manifest or exalt the act of writing, nor is it to pin a subject within 
language; it is, rather, a question of creating a space into which the 
writing subject constantly disappears”(102). This offers one approach to 
Burroughs’ texts, as they seem to foreground, especially in comparison 
with conventional narrative texts, the disappearance or evaporation of 
the author as a coherent source of originality and meaning. Burroughs 
commonly replied to questions around originality with regards to the cut-
up by claiming that life is a cut-up, which implies that any originality or 
creativity itself is a result of a kind of mental cutting-up of images and 
texts resulting in new arrangements, and as such, is only a more self-
conscious state of mind that is not radically different from our day-to-day 
experiences. By stating that consciousness itself operates as a kind of 
cut-up process, which raises the cut-up from the level of an artistic 
practice to an epistemological hypothesis, Burroughs truly positioned 
himself as avant-garde. From this perspective, we can better understand 
Burroughs’ own “mission”, which he quite concisely explained in The 
Job: Interviews with William S. Burroughs, Daniel Odier’s compilation of 
interviews and extracts published in 1974: 
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When people speak of clarity in writing they generally mean 
plot, continuity, beginning middle and end, adherence to a 
“logical” sequence. But things don’t happen in logical 
sequence and people don’t think in logical sequence. Any 
writer who hopes to approximate what actually occurs in the 
mind and body of his characters cannot confine himself to 
such an arbitrary structure as “logical” sequence. Joyce was 
accused of being unintelligible and he was presenting only 
one level of cerebral events: conscious sub-vocal speech. I 
think it is possible to create multilevel events and characters 
that a reader could comprehend with his entire organic 
being. (35) 
 
What this tells us is that Burroughs was consciously trying to 
“approximate what actually occurs in the mind and body of his 
characters”, or in other words, he was trying to represent with a certain 
authenticity the experiences of his characters. In fact, Burroughs claims 
here that his approach to representation is more valid precisely because 
it does not adhere to what is called here “logical sequence.” It is also 
noteworthy that Burroughs claimed his reader could “comprehend with 
his entire organic being” the characters and events in a work of literature, 
but this remained hypothetical at this point. It is another indicator of the 
avant-garde inspired pursuits that we can find within his works. 
 
III. Cut-up Poetics 
Not all of Burroughs’ widely read works contain cut-ups. Works like 
Junkie (1953) or Queer (1951, published in 1985) are of a more realist 
style. Even his most famous work, Naked Lunch, was written before he 
and his acquaintances started experimenting purposefully with the cut-up 
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technique. If we follow the line of reasoning attributed to Brion Gysin, 
Burroughs’ most famous collaborator, cut-up in literature is the mirroring 
of an evolution that occurred within painting in the early parts of the 20th 
century: “Writing is 50 years behind painting”3 (The Cut-Up Method of 
Brion Gysin, 1). This remark was to become one of Burroughs’ most 
famous arguments for why he started using the cut-up method in his 
writing. In a great number of interviews, Gysin is presented as the one 
who brought the technique to Burroughs’ attention. Thus, simply put, 
even though Burroughs is often associated with the cut-up, even 
sometimes thought of as its originator, it is better to think of this re-
appropriation of the technique pioneered by, among others, the Dadaists, 
as a result of an artistic collaboration. In one of the earliest substantial 
pieces of their cut-up work, Minutes to Go (1960), you can find 
contributions by Beat-authors and poets Sinclair Beiles and Gregory 
Corso as well, but their commitment was of a more temporary kind. It is 
Gysin and Burroughs who created some of the most important texts 
within the cut-up sphere. In claiming that literature lagged behind 
painting for 50 years, Burroughs expresses a harsh critique of the 
dominant literary styles and forms of the interwar period, since they fall 
into this 50-year period. In other texts, Burroughs locates the first 
experiments with cut-up in literature in works such as those by Joyce, 
John Dos Passos (1896-1970) and Tristan Tzara (1896-1963). This 
suggests to me that there is a difference between these authors’ 
experiments and those performed by Burroughs and Gysin. Otherwise, 
the claim made about literature in relation to painting becomes false, 
since the first cut-ups would have been made about 50 years before 
                                                          
3 The short essay The Cut-up Method of Brion Gysin can be found in The Third Mind, but it is 
also sometimes read individually. Another quote is: “The cut-up method brings to writers the 
collage, which has been used by painters for fifty years.” 
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Burroughs’ experiments, even according to the author himself, if we 
accept the works of Dadaïsts as early manifestations of the cut-up idea. 
 Nowadays, when something is regarded as avant-garde art, it is 
often so because it breaks with tradition in some creative way, as I’ve 
detailed above. In the bloody decade of the 1910’s, avant-garde had a 
supplementary meaning: these artists were at the forefront of utopian 
thought and ideals. Even in the case of Dada, the (in)famous group of 
poets, painters, writers and other artists who were radically opposed to 
the war and all that (they theorized) had led to it, you can find a rather 
explicit utopian ambition. Their artworks did not fit seamlessly within any 
tradition, consisting of ‘ready-mades’, collages and often alienating 
writings. It can be said that Dada sought to change art, the public’s 
stance on art, and society as a whole all at the same time. Below is a 
quote from Tristan Tzara, in which he directs a kind of anger at ‘logic’ 
itself:   
           
People think they can explain rationally, by means of thought, 
what they write. But it’s very relative. Thought is a fine thing 
for philosophy, but it’s relative. Psychoanalysis is a 
dangerous disease, it deadens man’s anti-real inclinations 
and systematises the bourgeoisie. There is no ultimate Truth. 
Dialectics is an amusing machine that leads us (in banal 
fashion) to the opinions which we would have held in any 
case. Do people really think that, by the meticulous subtlety 
of logic, they have demonstrated the truth and established 
the accuracy of their opinions? Even if logic were confirmed 
by the senses it would still be an organic disease. (Tzara, 9) 
 
The intensity of the piece in which I found this extract remains at this 
pitch; throughout the entire text Tzara tries to convince the reader that 
“DADA DOES NOT MEAN ANYTHING”. This claim is, in fact, the very 
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title of Tzara’s text. This radical resistance to any tradition, even ones 
that are often considered tools of cultural analysis and, arguably, 
resistance, such as dialectics and psychoanalysis, is typical of Dadaïsm. 
One must take care not to generalize artistic movements like these too 
much, but overall it seems correct to state that Dadaïsm, as the 
embodiment of anti-tradition, operates by a specific ‘logic’ that even 
prevents it from incorporating dialectics or psychoanalysis. Tzara’s 
position reminds us of the way Burroughs spoke about the cut-up 
method earlier, when he said that “things don’t happen in logical 
sequence and people don’t think in logical sequence.”    
 One of the most relevant works by Tzara in the context of this 
debate is “(How) To Make a Dadaist Poem” (1920), a poem or perhaps 
an instruction which, as the title suggests, explains certain elements of 
Tzara’s and Dadaist poetics. It is often quoted, and perhaps doesn’t 
shock anyone anymore, but it is important to include it here because it is 
one of the most transparent and simple explanations of the cut-up 
method in writing, and it emphasizes the countercultural impulse that lies 
at the heart of the cut-up: 
 
Take a newspaper  
Take some scissors.  
Choose from this paper an article the length you want to 
make your poem. 
Cut out the article.  
Next carefully cut out each of the words that make up this 
article and put them all in a bag. 
Shake gently. 
Next take out each cutting one after the other. 
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Copy conscientiously in the order in which they left the bag. 
The poem will resemble you. 
And there you are--an infinitely original author of charming 
sensibility,  
even though unappreciated by the vulgar herd. 
 
Tzara, here, makes a claim that is still controversial to this day, and one 
that was important in debates within post-structuralism, namely: the 
author is not the source of the work. Tzara’s short instructional “poem” 
focuses on the process of, and the possibility of, self-expression through 
a broad conception of authorship, a position which he opens up for 
everybody, while acknowledging the existence of a “vulgar herd”, 
presumably referring to those who would dismiss as non-art those 
products of Dadaist poetics, and who would vehemently defend the 
Author as quasi-sovereign in relation to the text and its meaning. 
 A more in-depth look at cut-up writing in Burroughs shows just how 
different it can be from regular writing. In The Soft Machine (1968), we 
find some of Burroughs’ most consistent and obvious usage of the cut-up 
technique. In many of his other texts, the cut-ups are sporadic or they 
are so integrated within other bits of more conventional narrative that it is 
possible to miss them or to mistake them for strange grammatical errors. 
The Soft Machine, however, consists for a large part of cut-ups. The 
following extract exemplifies Burroughs’ use of the cut-up as inspired by 
the older stream-of-consciousness style made famous by the 
Modernists: 
 
Saw the murder words in the guide’s head transparent and I 
couldn’t move back seat dreaming paralyzed like my mother 
couldn’t move paralyzed dream me talk me jack me off from 
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her bed of distant fingers a woman with red hair dead of 
course her image flashed in the guide’s eyes as the wrench 
fell and I was in the ‘bearer’ already feeling around to make 
myself the home the white score, we call it murder words like 
frantic fish in the shrinking body pool slow motion saw the 
heavy wrench fall and took the pictures from his eyes in the 
white flash and the guide did not know he had a hitch hiker 
until he his knowledge of English summoned more words that 
he knew and his Arabic only a thin shell around the lodger 
mud cubicles with blue painted walls his thin black body 
twisting sodomy shadows from the long masturbation nights 
of Columbus Ohio. (166)  
 
Not much further detail is given about the described murder-scene, and 
we never quite find out the person whose point of view we read. The 
extract is very dense, in the sense that it describes murder, the 
memories of a guide, a hitchhiker, the death of a red-haired woman and 
the “long masturbation nights of Columbus Ohio.” Where regular 
narrative text offers one a more- or less complex thread to follow, 
Burroughs’ cut-up texts offer many threads after another, but very few of 
them lead to any conclusion in the traditional sense.    
 Cut-up texts like the above contain a kind of exploration of their 
own limits, because they stretch the definition of what constitutes a text 
to a breaking point. They run the “risk” of discouraging their readers of 
reading them at all. Take for example this short extract from Odier’s 
collection of interviews with Burroughs, in which a text quite explicitly 
struggles with itself: 
 
(…) indispensably congruent multiplicity of otherness 
perspectives concomitantly banal irrelevant concentrates 
with orifices gritty interstices rectilinearally inaccessible. 
These jewels gathered from one of the periodicals admittedly 
subsidized by the CIA. If you see the function of word as 
extension of our senses to witness and experience through 
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the writer’s eyes then this may be dubbed blind prose. It sees 
nothing and neither does the reader. Not an image in a 
cement mixer of this word paste. As a literary exercise I pick 
up the Penguin translation of Rimbaud and select images to 
place in congruent juxtapositions with this colorless vampiric 
prose which having no color of its own must steal color from 
the readers such contractually accessible linguistically 
structuralized preparations on blue evenings I shall go 
down(…) (104-105, Odier) 
 
If I try to summarize this short piece of text I am forced to speak in 
descriptive terms. The text starts with a summing up of words later called 
‘blind prose’ which is said to introduce no images into the mind of the 
reader (“It sees nothing and neither does the reader.”) After the narrator 
gives his analysis of this “word paste” he proceeds to “pick up the 
Penguin translation of Rimbaud” and to interlace the “blind prose” with 
fragments of the symbolist poets’ highly colourful and suggestive poetry, 
such as “blue evenings”, resulting in what the narrator seems to imply is 
no longer blind prose.         
 Burroughs frequently references Alfred J. Korzybski in interviews, 
lectures and essays. Korzybski was a Polish-American thinker in a field 
one could call philosophy, although I’m not convinced that Korzybski 
considered his work part of philosophy. Although his field of study is in 
some ways highly relevant for literary studies, linguistics and philosophy, 
his works are somewhat hard to find and not commonly known. Two 
large works, Manhood of Humanity (1921) and Science and Sanity 
(1933) and various smaller texts form a collection of works that is 
exceedingly difficult to place into a single academic niche. Korzybski 
himself called his field of study General Semantics, but it is probably best 
explained as a study of the affect of language. His works can be 
understood in relation to that of Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914), who 
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recognized three elements of a semiotic: the sign, the object and the 
interpretant. Korzybski’s theory incorporates the idea that, as Peirce 
stated, “every thought must be interpreted in another”, and as such “all 
thought is in signs” (C.S. Peirce, 253). The following is an extract in 
which Korzybski positions himself quite clearly in opposition to binary 
thought: 
 
In mankind’s cultural evolution its current abstractions 
became codified here and there into systems, for instance 
the Aristotelian system, our main concern here. Such 
systematizations are important, for, as the Talmud says, 
‘Teaching without a system makes learning difficult.’ In 
analysing the Aristotelian codifications, I had to deal with the 
two valued, ‘either-or’ type of orientations. I admit it baffled 
me for many years, that practically all humans, the lowest 
primitives not excluded, who never heard of Greek 
philosophers, have some sort of ‘either-or’ type of 
evaluations. Then I made the obvious ‘discovery’ that our 
relations to the world outside and inside our skins often 
happen to be, on the gross level, two-valued. For instance, 
we deal with day or night, land or water, etc. On the living 
level we have life or death, our heart beats or not, we breathe 
or suffocate, we are hot or cold, etc. Similar relations occur 
on higher levels. Thus, we have induction or deduction, 
materialism or idealism (...)       
 In living, many issues are not so sharp, and therefore a 
system which posits the general sharpness of ´either-or’, and 
so objectifies ‘kind’, is unduly limited; it must be revised and 
made more flexible in terms of ‘degree’. This requires a 
physic-mathematical ‘way of thinking’ which a non-
aristotelian system supplies. (Selections From Science and 
Sanity, xxxiii) 
 
Korzybski’s theoretical work is, in its own way, avant-gardist, because he 
states quite often that his intent is to change the way human beings 
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interact and deal with emotions or affect, through rethinking language 
and our systems of logic. He seems to have been fairly optimistic with 
regards to the possibility for humanity to reconsider how its everyday 
logic is “unduly limited”, which is something that is echoed in Burroughs’ 
texts at certain points. Burroughs’ characters often resist what Korzybski 
called “the is of identity”, or the idea that one can identify within language 
all that someone or something is. A dog is only a dog to the extent that 
our mind constructs the category of dogs, but as Korzybski would say, 
every dog is fully unique and irreducible in the same way that a group of 
5 persons whose names are all Alfred cannot justifiably be reduced to a 
group of Alfreds. Korzybski’s work can, in this sense, be interpreted as a 
provocation or a challenge to mankind to break from the systems of 
association and categorization (e.g. something is either this or that) that, 
he argues, are holding back the entire species. This position is an avant-
gardist and utopian one because it posits a future society which is 
radically different from ours in a good or desirable way. Burroughs’ cut-
up texts can also be interpreted in this way, without categorizing it as 
either (narrative) literature or something else, like a kind of poetry or an 
artistic experiment that is not literature, and I think that this is an 
approach that the presence of the cut-up itself necessitates.  
    
3. ...Barbarism... 
IV. Barbarians and History 
A highly placed narcotics official tells a grim President: “The 
wild-boy thing is a cult based on drugs, depravity and 
violence more dangerous than the hydrogen bomb.” (The 
Wild Boys, 151) 
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The barbarian, either outside the walls of ‘our’ civilization or within 
ourselves, connotes violence. The barbarians are perceived as a threat, 
not just because they are violent, but also because they can focus their 
aggression beyond mere random destruction, and their strengths are our 
own perceived weaknesses. They are the scissors, if you will, that 
threaten to cut up our paper Empire. Etymologically stemming from an 
emulation of the unintelligible sounds that the language of foreigners 
supposedly made from the perspective of the ancient Greeks,  sounding 
like bar-bar, the barbarian was conceived by the Greeks as a human 
being who simply lacks the tools to communicate with the civilized man. 
Any interaction with a barbarian would be perceived as marked by 
complete and utter mis- or noncommunication. However, as is often the 
case with such problematic stereotypical categorizations, there have also 
been positive appropriations of the term. The historical avant-gardes I 
discussed before, such as Dada, are an example of this. They 
intentionally occupied the position of the barbarian towards established 
cultural conventions about Art. Burroughs can also be viewed as such.
 In cultural analysis, the terms barbarism, the barbarian(s) and 
barbaric have in recent years grown in relevance. As Maria Boletsi notes 
in her book Barbarism and Its Discontents (2013):  
 
Revisiting underexposed aspects of barbarism unravels its 
potential operations in language and other media without 
circumventing its violent history in Western discourses and 
without rendering it “harmless.” In the gaps and tensions 
between its various meanings, between its history and 
present uses, and between its formal meanings in language 
and its effects in speech, one can trace possibilities for doing 
different things with this concept in the space of literature, 
art, and theory. (2) 
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It is precisely one of these possibilities that I wish to engage with: 
barbarism in literature, in the form of the cut-up text. In establishing a 
connection between these two terms, one makes certain decisions and 
assumptions about what the terms ‘stand for’, what they imply and bring 
about. Reading the cut-up operation as a barbaric operation, I do not 
only attribute ‘barbaric’ elements to the cut-up, but also do the opposite: I 
imply that barbaric acts are acts of cutting-up. In the following pages, I 
will compare my own use of the term ‘barbarism’ with others, in an 
attempt to delineate my use of barbarism in this thesis more rigorously in 
relation to specific traditions of use of this concept. After this short but all 
the more necessary operation, I will attempt to show what kind of 
productivity is made possible by reading the cut-ups as a form of 
barbarism.           
 The word “barbarian” is defined in the Merriam-Webster dictionary 
as a human being that is “of or relating to a land, culture, or people alien 
and usually believed to be inferior to another land, culture, or people” or 
as “lacking refinement, learning, or artistic or literary culture.” In other 
words, it is a word that is defined by what it isn’t or by a lack. Its 
etymology supports this: it is thought to come, as I mentioned before, 
from the non-words uttered by those foreign peoples the ancient Greeks 
encountered from elsewhere, which sounded something like “bar-bar” to 
their ears. This etymological background is interesting, because it means 
that we are dealing with a word which carries within it the idea of 
misunderstanding. I would propose the following multi-layered definition 
of the barbarian: a figure misunderstood and unintelligible; a figure 
understood to be the antithesis of civilization. In a way, then, the 
barbarian is understood (as antithesis), but this understanding requires 
an unwillingness to understand the other’s language (or perspective) in 
an attempt to produce a more stable view of the self, reinforced by the 
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observed flaws in the other. More generally, the barbarian represents the 
inability of a civilization to consciously incorporate into its structure those 
elements that provoke unintelligibility and misunderstanding, and thus, it 
is a word uttered by the civilized upon encountering something they do 
not understand (or are unwilling to understand).     
 The mobilisation of the concept of barbarism within a consumerist 
society or within the confines of a self-proclaimed civilization is more 
often than not embedded in reactionary or exclusionary practices rather 
than in acts of resistance to hegemonic power. In fact, as has been 
argued aplenty, barbarism often functions as a means of legitimizing 
civilization by the civilized. As Boletsi notes: “The legitimacy of an Empire 
[...] is grounded in the construction of the barbarians—an external enemy 
that generates ‘nightmares of impending attack’ and justifies escalations 
of military violence” (63). In the current political climate in “the West” the 
figure of the barbarian is most commonly invoked in a reactionary 
manner, used to justify many military interventions in a manner that 
resembles the well-known use of the trope for the justification of 
colonialist practices in the past.        
 In Burroughs’ descriptions of the Wild Boys, we can see how the 
American generals and other officials view the Wild Boys as mere wild 
men or savages without of a culture of their own. The differences 
between the tropes of the wild man and the barbarian are many, but 
chief amongst them is the idea that the barbarian has a culture and 
perhaps a civilization, if inferior, of its own, whereas the wild man does 
not. The figure of the barbarian, by the grace of its possession of a 
culture of its own, also possesses the means to fight back in ways that 
the wild man could not. All the various focalisations and perspectives that 
Burroughs’ characters and narrators cast upon the Wild Boys leave us 
unsure of whether they are closer to wild men, as their name might 
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suggest, or to barbarians, as the more positive descriptions of, for 
example, their military prowess might suggest. The Wild Boys seem to 
see themselves as a superior cultural formation, but the dominant sees 
them as a cultureless threat to their own culture.     
 One of the most obvious examples of the mobilization of the trope 
of the barbarian for purposes of power-struggle is the United States and 
its allies’ War on Terror in the Middle-East. It is obvious that this is a war 
between two or more parties, neither of which can be reduced, even 
though attempts are made, to the trope of the wild man; they both have a 
notable culture. In fact, it is what we might call the strength of their 
culture which is a major problem for both parties. The Wild Boys can also 
be read like this; they are described as having their own traditions, their 
own ways of communicating, their own (sexual) rituals and even their 
own way of reproducing. They are also brought into being initially by the 
discontent that young men experience, which is caused by the dystopian 
governance that exists in the world of Burroughs’ texts. The status quo 
that the Wild Boys seek to destroy can be described as a caricature of 
the global capitalism our own societies have grown into in the past 
centuries, a process going on to this day: “At Tent City a top-level 
conference is in progress involving top level executives in the CONTROL 
GAME. The Conference has been called by a Texas billionaire who 
contributes heavily to MRA and maintains a stable of evangelists” (34, 
The Wild Boys). This world of Burroughs’ fiction is populated by those in 
control, those under control and those young men who break free to 
join/form the Wild Boys. It is easy to see that this construction isn’t 
necessarily time-bound or specific to the time in which it was written 
about. Reading his texts with a focus on their use of the trope of the 
barbarian, which the Wild Boys in my view exemplify, allows Burroughs’ 
cut-up texts to be read as a critique of repressive political systems, from 
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Burroughs’ time to the present. In other words, the function of the Wild 
Boys, as I will show, emulates in a certain way the ‘barbaric’ function of 
the cut-up itself in Burroughs; where the cut-up threatens the stability of 
the role of narrative in literature,  the Wild Boys threaten various 
elements of American culture which it experiences as fundamental to 
itself.            
 It is often the case that the figure of the barbarian is used as a plot 
device in fiction, as it is in politics, serving as mirror for the civilized 
protagonist or simply serving as antagonist. Perhaps you are familiar 
with the poem Waiting for the Barbarians (1904) by Constantine P. 
Cavafy(1863-1933)? Here it is: 
 
What are we waiting for, assembled in the forum?  
           The barbarians are due here today.  
  
Why isn’t anything happening in the senate? 
Why do the senators sit there without legislating? 
  
             Because the barbarians are coming today. 
             What laws can the senators make now? 
             Once the barbarians are here, they’ll do the legislating.  
  
Why did our emperor get up so early, 
and why is he sitting at the city’s main gate 
on his throne, in state, wearing the crown? 
  
             Because the barbarians are coming today 
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             and the emperor is waiting to receive their leader. 
             He has even prepared a scroll to give him, 
             replete with titles, with imposing names. 
  
Why have our two consuls and praetors come out today 
wearing their embroidered, their scarlet togas? 
Why have they put on bracelets with so many amethysts, 
and rings sparkling with magnificent emeralds? 
Why are they carrying elegant canes 
beautifully worked in silver and gold? 
  
Because the barbarians are coming today 
       and things like that dazzle the barbarians. 
  
Why don’t our distinguished orators come forward as usual 
to make their speeches, say what they have to say? 
  
            Because the barbarians are coming today 
            and they’re bored by rhetoric and public speaking. 
   
Why this sudden restlessness, this confusion? 
(How serious people’s faces have become.) 
Why are the streets and squares emptying so rapidly, 
everyone going home so lost in thought? 
  
Because night has fallen and the barbarians have not 
come. 
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            And some who have just returned from the border say 
             there are no barbarians any longer. 
  
  And now, what’s going to happen to us without barbarians? 
They were, those people, a kind of solution. (Cavafy,15) 
 
In this poem, the barbarians serve as an (as of yet) absent cause of 
critical reflection for the civilians. They question the conduct of their 
superiors and leaders under rumours of the coming barbarians, 
expressing their surprise at the sudden decadence that their orators 
display. I interpret the conduct of these leaders within the poem as 
caused by fearfulness and self-preservation, although it could also be 
argued that they actually await the coming of the barbarians with 
excitement. It should be noted that the poem does not actually tell of the 
arrival of the barbarians. In fact, one of its key features is this perennial 
postponement of their arrival. At the end of the poem, it is suggested that 
the barbarians have evaporated or have, perhaps, never existed at all, 
purely having been a phantasmatic source of anxiety for the rulers of 
Rome: 
 
            Because night has fallen and the barbarians have not come. 
            And some who have just returned from the border say 
            there are no barbarians any longer. 
 
It is this role that barbarians often seem to play in fiction. What fascinates 
me about this is the dual nature of the barbarian; as a phantasmatic 
threat to civilization and as a very corporeal or physical one. In Cavafy’s 
poem, both of these options are present, because throughout the poem 
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the reader is in expectation of the eventual arrival of the barbarians who 
seem to possess so much force that violent resistance is out of the 
question, and diplomacy is immediately prepared. The revelation that 
‘there are no barbarians any longer’ can be interpreted in many ways. 
Perhaps they did indeed evaporate; perhaps they left to threaten 
someplace more “civilized”, perhaps they were never there and were 
only imaginary, or perhaps they have been assimilated by the Empire 
and have replaced the rulers so quickly that the citizens do not even 
realize it. It is not impossible to conclude that, at the end of the poem, the 
barbarians have become part of the empire, and thus ‘civilized’.  
 This endless interplay between their (non-)existence and their in-
/exteriority is highly relevant for a reading of avant-gardist art like that of 
Burroughs. This is because this type of art is to a large extent defined by 
its play with in-/exteriority; it is only avant-garde art if it stands with one 
foot in a tradition (that which motivates people to ask that common 
question: is this art?) and with the other stands elsewhere. One of the 
interesting considerations that Dadaïst art requires you to make is 
exactly this one: is this artwork I’m seeing interior to (part of-) or exterior 
to (outside of-) the Arts, or culture, as I know it? Does Duchamp’s 
L.H.O.O.Q. (1919) truly exist as Art (or, within the discourse of Art) or is it 
something else? And the most satisfying conclusion would likely be that 
Dadaïst works are both part of a tradition and fiercely independent of any 
established interpretative framework at the same time. Similarly, 
Burroughs’ works are cut-ups of many famous texts, something which 
suggests that they are part of the tradition of the novel, simply because 
they are in dialogue with them. And yet, the reader will struggle if he 
assumes a more traditional reading attitude towards these works. One 
aspect of their ‘barbarism’, then, is the idea that they require a new type 
of reading attitude to even try to interpret.     
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 Some of the functions of the cut-up as a form of barbarism can be 
better understood through an exploration of the function of the ‘barbarian’ 
figures within Burroughs’ works: the Wild Boys. The Wild Boys 
themselves become a more detailed group throughout a number of 
novels, although they are also revised and changed throughout these 
texts. They are not, in other words, a one-dimensional countercultural 
force. They evolve continuously and groups often develop different traits 
independently of one-another. They are all homosexual and, from a 
conservative perspective, utterly immoral, often described as having sex 
on the corpses of the US soldiers they just cut-down with huge bowie 
knives. Here is one of the origin stories that could be considered the to 
be the starting point for the Wild Boys, although there are others: 
 
Spring in Marrakech is always uneasy each day a little hotter 
knowing what Marrakech can be in August. That spring 
gasoline gangs prowled the rubbish heaps, alleys and 
squares of the city dousing just anybody with gasoline and 
setting that person on fire. They rush in anywhere nice young 
couple sitting in their chintzy middle-class living room when 
hello! yes hello! the gas boys rush in douse them head to foot 
with a pump fire extinguisher full of gasoline and I got some 
good pictures from a closet where I had prudently taken 
refuge. Shot of the boy who lit the match he let the rank and 
file slosh his couple then he lit a Swan match face young 
pure, pitiless as the cleansing fire brought the match close 
enough to catch the fumes. Then he lit a Player with the same 
match sucked the smoke in and smiled, he was listening to 
the screams and I thought My God what a cigarette ad: 
Clambake on a beach the BOY there with a match. He is 
looking at two girls in bikinis. As he lights the match they lean 
forward with a 
LUCKYSTRIKECHESTERFIELDOLDGOLDCAMELPLAYER in 
the bim and give a pert little salute. The BOY turned out to be 
the hottest property in advertising. Enigmatic smile on the 
delicate young face. Just what is the BOY looking at? (The 
Wild Boys, 143) 
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The extremely violent scene described in the above extract fascinates its 
narrator who, from the safety of his closet, observes everything. The 
fragment begs certain simple questions, such as: why is the narrator in a 
closet in someone else's living room, holding a camera? Why the 
immediate association with advertising and capitalism? And, perhaps 
more urgently, where is the 'humanity' of each of these characters? 
Anger and horror are replaced by smiles and advertisement 
opportunities. None of these things are ever explained within the text. It 
seems very significant that this narrator, who is apparently a shrewd 
advertiser or at least someone with money in mind, is so blind to the 
violence he witnesses. I interpret this scene as a statement about the 
violence that capitalism brings into being and then fails to understand in 
its own language. The scene continues as follows:  
 
We had set out to sell cigarettes or whatever else we were 
paid to sell. The BOY was too hot to handle. Temples were 
erected to the BOY and there were posters of his face 
seventy feet high and all the teenagers began acting like the 
BOY looking at you with a dreamy look lips parted over their 
Wheaties. They all bought BOY shirts and BOY knives running 
around like wolf packs burning, looting, killing it spread 
everywhere all that summer in Marrakech the city would light 
up at night human torches flickering on walls, trees, fountains 
all very romantic you could map the dangerous areas sitting 
on your balcony under the stars sipping a Scotch. (The Wild 
Boys, 144) 
 
Again, the narrator interprets extreme violence and quasi-religious 
zealotry as romantic instead of finding it, at least, somewhat problematic. 
It is quite possible to read the above extracts as a strangely fitting 
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allegory for the rise of religious violence and extremism in our present 
time. They offer a narrative in which extremism has come into being 
through capitalist machinations, and has then become 'too hot to handle'. 
It is not an unusual argument to make nowadays that capitalism and by 
extension foreign interventions by capitalist nations are one of the key 
constituents of the rise of fundamentalism. But, interestingly, the narrator 
admires the Wild Boys’ faces and mercilessness at multiple points. Their 
faces ‘young pure’ and their smile enigmatic certainly suggest 
admiration. Although this admiration could be ironic, it is likely when 
taking into account the recurrent themes of violence in Burroughs that 
there is a legitimate admiration and perhaps desire for the Wild Boy’s 
radical violence. Of course, the above extract doesn’t go so far as 
portraying the rise of the Wild Boys as a total revolution, because the 
narrator tells us we could “map the dangerous areas sitting on your 
balcony under the stars sipping a Scotch.” This leads us to an important 
element of the Wild Boy mythos, which is the fact that, throughout 
Burroughs novels, we never know for sure whether they will be 
victorious, or whether their “creators”, those whose behaviour led to their 
uprising, are too powerful. As is the case with many of Burroughs’ 
characters and events, one’s interpretation of them can differ wildly 
depending on which description of them one reads. This ambivalence, 
however, is a key part of their barbarism, because, as we also saw in 
Cavafy’s poem, in the case of the barbarian as in the case of the Wild 
Boys it is often the mere idea of their advance that pushes civilization 
into action: as more and more young boys and men move away from 
“civilization” to join the Wild Boys, figures like General Greenfield which I 
mentioned in my introduction feel pressured to mobilize their forces and 
to fight the Wild Boys. 
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V. Cut-ups as Barbarism 
If the Wild Boys, as barbarian figures, carry an insurgent, revolutionary 
energy, this energy also runs through the cut-up, viewed as a barbarian 
practice. The word barbarism can also be used to describe the very 
practice of cutting-up, of taking texts from elsewhere and fragmenting 
them in what can be seen as a violent act. To cut-up the poems of 
Rimbaud, which seem so carefully crafted and measured, seems 
offensive, in some ways. The initial response from a Rimbaud scholar or 
enthusiast would likely be one of doubt and irritation. And yet, perhaps 
after the initial reaction a more positive one might follow, because of the 
realization that the oeuvre of Rimbaud is both historical and delineated 
and open to manipulation and alteration by modern readers so as to 
multiply its usefulness and influence from simply material to read and 
write about, to material to write with.       
 A theoretical framework that can be invaluable in reading 
Burroughs is that of post-structuralism. The connection between 
Burroughs’ theories and those of important poststructuralist theorists is 
not made often, perhaps because it seems so obvious, or maybe his 
works weren’t very widely read by thinkers in this field. A piece of cut-up 
text carries a sense of ‘incompleteness’ within itself that cannot be 
undone. Cut-up texts make their reader acutely aware of his/her desire 
for meaning or interpretation, because they resist this desire and, 
arguably, reflect it back. What makes cut-up texts suitable for a post-
structuralist reading, then, is a denial of structure.     
 Jacques Derrida’s well-known lecture translated as Structure, Sign, 
and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences (1978), in which he 
examines the works of Claude Lévi-Strauss, and different interpretations 
of interpretation itself, opens as follows:  
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Perhaps something has occurred in the history of the concept 
of structure that could be called an “event,” if this loaded 
word did not entail a meaning which it is precisely the 
function of structural—or structurality—thought to reduce or 
to suspect. (1)  
 
Cut-up texts can perhaps be considered as events, or at least “eventful” 
in this sense: they feature that which structure is “thought to reduce or 
suspect”, and they feature it plentifully. Derrida claims, furthermore, that 
a structure limits the so-called free play or “freeplay” (as it is spelled in 
the text) of its elements because it has a center which limits and 
prevents this freeplay from being functionally infinite: 
 
No doubt that by orienting and organizing the coherence of 
the system, the center of a structure permits the freeplay of 
its elements inside the total form. And even today the notion 
of a structure lacking any center represents the unthinkable 
itself.         
Nevertheless, the center also closes off the freeplay it opens 
up and makes possible. Qua center, it is the point at which 
the substitution of contents, elements, or terms is no longer 
possible. At the center, the permutation or the transformation 
of elements (which may of course be structures enclosed 
within a structure) is forbidden. (1) 
 
This is a key poststructuralist argument against the structuralist paradigm 
from which the field emerged. With regards to literature, one could say 
that the narrative text is a structure that, though not entirely devoid of 
freeplay, is certainly regulated by a centre that is unchanging or 
constant. And any structure, or in our case, any narrative text, obeys the 
gravitational pull, as it were, of this centre, no matter how freely its 
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elements seem to have been put in place. Cut-up texts, then, serve as 
illustrations for this idea, because they enable the negation of this centre 
when and if they are fully cut-up, that is, purely consisting of words in 
random, non-syntactical, order such as, say: reject walking nomenclature 
be shake entropic militancy. However, few readers or authors would be 
interested in such a text. Instead, in order for them to become cut-up 
novels or poems, structure, as Derrida defines it, must be reinstated ever 
so minimally by the adherence to a centre; a centre that defines the 
transition from cut-up language into cut-up literature.    
 Cut-ups can thus be seen as the negation of structure, but always 
only to a certain limited extent, because they are consistently combined 
with regular prose throughout Burroughs’ works. Theorizing the cut-ups 
as barbarism – a concept that often signifies total destruction - can be 
somewhat of a dead-end in this sense. They do represent a breaking 
down of the mechanisms that make narrative prose into what it is, but an 
equally important element, at least for the way in which Burroughs uses 
cut-ups, is the reconstitution of at least trace-levels of narrativity. The 
following extract from The Ticket That Exploded (1968) is selected 
because it exemplifies very well the extent to which the cut-up texts tread 
into mystical or even delirious-sounding language, therefore breaking in 
major ways with literary and narrative conventions: 
 
For i have known fires – Isn’t time is there left, cool finder 
running on our ticket that exploded, larval circumstances at 
far end of the creek? And these dogs knew nothing shifting 
the dominion of circumstances – What bronze mold blooms in 
aging roots? – response in the fading body beside you? (71) 
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Not much can be said about who speaks here, or to whom the many 
questions are posed. And yet, a few lines later we read: “Bradly’s canoe 
of paper-thin black wood grounded on an island of swamp 
cypresses”(72). This, of course, signals one of the many sudden returns 
to narrative form that occur throughout the cut-up novels. The return to 
such forms does not invalidate the ‘destructive’ function of the cut-ups, 
but in fact gives the cut-ups increased potential for being disruptive. That 
is, the very presence of normal narrative elements in the texts activates 
the ‘barbarian’ function of the cut-ups because these narrative elements 
create that which the cut-ups can disrupt and even destroy. In the next 
chapter, I will attempt to interpret what I previously called the mystical 
character of the language that often results from Burroughs’ cut-up 
experiments, and how this relates to my emancipatory and political 
reading of his works. The role of the Wild Boys in this mystical element of 
the language of Burroughs’ novels is strangely limited, because 
interestingly, many of the descriptions of their rituals and characteristics 
are actually described in a documentary or journalistic style:  
 
A tall boy black as ebony steps onto the rug. He scans the 
sky. He walks around the rug three times. He walks back to 
the center of the rug. He brings both hands down and shakes 
his head. The music stops. The boys drift away. It was 
explained to me that the ceremony I had just witnessed was 
performed after a battle in case any of the boys who had just 
been killed wished to return and that those who had lost their 
hands might wish to do since the body is born whole. 
However most of the spirits would have gone to the Blue 
Desert of Silence. (160, The Wild Boys) 
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The fact that descriptions of the Wild Boys seldom coincide with 
extensive cut-up use is difficult to explain. Perhaps because the Wild 
Boys are one of the more unique elements of the world that Burroughs 
describes there was a tendency to write about them mostly in linear 
narrative. Whatever the case may be, if we assume that the Wild Boys 
inhabit the same sphere as those things described in cut-up language, 
they are not unrelated to each other. 
 
4. ...and the Future 
VI. Barbarism, Cut-ups, and the Future 
It is The Human Virus. (All viruses are deteriorated cells 
leading a parasitic existence... they have specific affinity for 
the Mother Cell; thus deteriorated liver cells seek the home 
place of hepatitis, etc. So every species has a Master Virus: 
Deteriorated Image of that species.) The broken image of 
Man moves in minute by minute and cell by cell... Poverty, 
hatred, war, police-criminals, bureaucracy, insanity, all 
symptoms of The Human Virus. The Human Virus can now be 
isolated and treated. (Naked Lunch, 141) 
 
The idea that every species has a “Master Virus” which is a “Deteriorated 
Image of that species”, and that there is therefore a “Human Virus”, is a 
remarkably provocative way of diagnosing a certain set of problems that 
humanity undeniably struggles with. “Poverty, hatred, war, police-
criminals, bureaucracy, insanity” are symptoms that are usually viewed 
as related but separate problems, but the above quote theorizes that 
they have the same viral origin. The last sentence suggests this virus 
can be “isolated and treated”, but how?      
 The concept of the barbarian Other often stands in relation to a 
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future, or an expectation of a possible future, in which the barbarians 
have arrived. Whether that image of the future is desired or feared, as is 
so ambiguous in Cavafy’s poem, doesn’t necessarily matter for this point; 
what matters is that the barbarians always carry a strong image of a 
radically different future with them. In order for me to even conceive of 
that argument I am deeply indebted to a work by the French philosopher 
Jean-Pierre Dupuy called Economy & The Future (2014). As you’ve seen 
in Cavafy’s poem, as soon as the barbarian-to-come dissolves, 
civilization enters into a crisis that is hard to fathom but very meaningful 
within our modern times. In his book, Dupuy hypothesizes that Economy, 
with a capital e and without any article before it, has consumed –and has 
come to embody— our politics and our religion. This claim rests on the 
observation that Economy has started to play such a disproportionately 
large role in our lives that it has started to become, as I would call it, the 
master-signifier which has started to appear as the origin of all authority 
or sovereignty. The acceleration of capitalism and consumerism brings 
with it radical insecurities and precariousness in our experience of our 
relation to the future. The relation this process has to violence resonates 
clearly from the history of the 1930’s and even the 1910’s. Various 
“theological” claims, such as the one that the economic growth and 
progress proceeds through expansions and contractions, mirror the 
reading of bird-flock formations in order to predict events in the Roman 
Empire. They are the fictions that are mechanically necessary for the 
system to function and for human subjects within it to retain some hold 
on the future. The fact that banks function, at an ontological level, purely 
in relation to the future (in terms of projected growth, debts et cetera) is 
another element that accentuates the eerie similarities that the Economy 
has to theological conceptions of reality, in which life on earth is 
validated by a future-to-come. To recognize the function that Economy 
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and religion share in relation to the future reveals a deep ideological 
process which is similar to the process by which one culture might 
construct another as barbarian as I described earlier. Both of these 
processes are mechanisms of self-justification through an unwillingness 
to accept similarities, or through the construction of differences, be it 
between one culture and another or between Economy and religious 
attitudes towards the future that Dupuy describes.    
 Many capitalist consumers nowadays, myself included, would 
consider themselves to be atheists and would likely be somewhat 
startled by the idea that the space religion occupies in people’s lives can 
be subsumed by Economy. In other words, capitalist ideology does 
resists being identified as belonging to a religious category, preferring 
itself to be associated with empiricism and science. In the realm of 
politics, for example, we have all heard the term ‘austerity’ being used a 
lot in recent times. Interpreted in the quasi-religious framework of 
Economy that I just sketched with the help of Dupuy’s work, austerity, 
which is the limitation of wealth and “freedom” for those who are 
considered to have proven themselves as being “undeserving” by the 
dominant gaze, takes on the form of a martyrdom imposed from without. 
At the most cynical level, it is proof of the sadistic dimensions of political 
power. Belief is strong in the idea that those who have sinned before the 
Economy must repent. The only reason why this idea has a place in the 
paradigmatic discourse of Economy is because markets, existing in the 
end only as an enormous community of human beings, collectively 
respond to it. That the belief in self-punishment is so pervasive both in 
monotheistic religions of the West and in the minds of people 
themselves, is telling for the way in which Economy assimilates old 
religious ideas into its own structure.      
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 In a chapter called Economy and the Problem of Evil, Dupuy 
discusses the phenomenon that he calls “the naturalisation of evil”: 
 
The great moral horrors of the twentieth century brought into 
existence a new order of evil that was the exact opposite of 
the one Rousseau had described. Vladimir Jankélévitch 
called Rousseau’s conception an “antropodicy,” which is to 
say a theodicy in which man is substituted for God. In the new 
conception, the primacy of God (or “nature”) was restored, to 
the point that it now became possible to speak of the 
naturalisation of evil.       
 In 1958, the German philosopher Günther Anders 
travelled to Hiroshima and Nagasaki to take part in the Fourth 
Wold Conference against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs. After 
many conversations with survivors of the catastrophe, he 
noted in his diary: “Their steadfast resolve not to speak of 
those who were to blame, not to say that the event had been 
caused by human beings; not to harbour the least 
resentment, even though they were the victims of the 
greatest of crimes—this really is too much for me, it passes 
all understanding.” And he added: “They constantly speak of 
the catastrophe as if it were an earthquake or a tidal wave. 
They use the Japanese word, tsunami.” (Dupuy, p. 4-5) 
 
Rousseau had proclaimed that violence, even that violence which is 
known as natural violence, such as earthquakes or floods, exists as 
violence only because of humanity, and thus not God or “nature” but 
humanity itself, at a fundamental level, is responsible for it. The irony that 
arises in the situation described above is, of course, that violence 
orchestrated by distinctly human agents is in the above quote conceived 
of in the same way as a tsunami. The factor that unites catastrophes 
such as a tsunami with that of the explosion of a nuclear bomb over 
Hiroshima in 1945 is their law-destroying character for those who suffer 
it. Walter Benjamin calls this type of violence divine violence, in contrast 
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to law-establishing violence that, in his Critique of Violence, is called 
mythic violence. In Derrida’s reading of Benjamin’s Critique of Violence, 
called Force of Law (2002), we read the following: 
 
The concept of violence (Gewalt) permits an evaluative 
critique only in the sphere of law and justice (Recht, 
Gerechtigkeit) or the sphere of moral relations (sittliche 
Verhältnisse). There is no natural or physical violence. One 
can speak figuratively of violence with regard to an 
earthquake or even to a physical ailment. But one knows that 
these are not cases of a Gewalt able to give rise to a 
judgment, before some instrument of justice. The concept of 
violence belongs to the symbolic order of law, politics and 
morals—of all forms of authority and of authorization, of claim 
to authority, at least. (Derrida, 265) 
 
When interpreted as such, we can say that the type of violence that is 
associated with the “great moral horrors of the twentieth century”, as 
Dupuy calls them and with which I certainly agree, is experienced as a 
type of divine or natural violence because it evades or even destroys the 
power of any system of law that is not the law of God or nature itself. Any 
attempt to bring to justice, or at least to “court”, these events, would 
expose the law in its final impotence. Arrested Nazis, responsible for the 
horrors of the Holocaust, can be brought before the law only, in spoken 
terms, for crimes of a lower order, never for the Holocaust in its totality. 
From a formal perspective, it is the network, or the system, of which they 
were a part, that denies the law some of its capacity for judgment. It is in 
this light that Adolf Eichmann, for example, could not be officially 
convicted for killing anyone, instead being judged for various other 
elements that together made the Holocaust into what it was, specifically 
the organisatory function he had fulfilled.      
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 We intuitively know, of course, that there is a difference between a 
tsunami and the detonation of an atomic bomb, but this difference is at 
certain points eclipsed by what they share: they are law-shattering forms 
of violence. Taking Rousseau’s humanist position into account, we can 
say that all violence finds its origin in none other than humanity, be it in 
the case of a tsunami or in the case of the Holocaust, and also in the 
case of the fictional violence of the Wild Boys, but their radical difference 
resides in how they appear before the law. The fact that the Holocaust 
and the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki are conceptualized in a 
similar way by people who were witness and victim of them emphasizes 
the gap that exists between the Cartesian notion of the thinking subject 
on which so much in our society thinks itself to be grounded in and the 
inconsistencies that appear upon closer inspection. As Dupuy stated in 
the quote I used above: “the primacy of God (or “nature”) was restored, 
to the point that it now became possible to speak of the naturalisation of 
evil.” (4-5)            
 The Wild Boys come into being as a response to what Burroughs 
considers to be symptoms of “The Human Virus.” In a way, they are 
Burroughs’ fictional remedy to the very real violence that he attributes to 
the Virus: poverty, hatred, war, et cetera. The Boys are fiercely loyal to 
each other, ready to sacrifice themselves for their collective pursuits, and 
they are freed of language, or The Word, which is the primary system of 
control utilized by those in control. In this way, they are a group of hand-
crafted, imaginary, future human beings that have evolved past any 
vulnerability to the Virus. It is essential to note that the Wild Boys are 
perhaps most fundamentally a critique of the traditional family structure 
that informed the American Dream, and the organisation of (American) 
society for a long time. The idea that a husband, a wife and some 
children together constitute the ideal family unit which drives society (and 
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perhaps more importantly Economy) onwards towards growth and 
improvement, isn’t new, but it is a typical subject of critique in the 1960’s 
counterculture that Burroughs was a part of. In some interviews, 
Burroughs referenced Austrian psychoanalyst Wilhelm Reich’s thesis 
about the origins of fascism and specifically Nazism, as detailed in 
Reich’s work The Mass Psychology of Fascism (1933), which blames 
strict family structures and specifically the so-called ‘authoritarian family’ 
for making possible the rise of Europe’s fascist regimes:  
 
To comprehend the relation between sexual suppression and 
human exploitation, it is necessary to get an insight into the 
basic social institution in which the economic and sex-
economic situation of patriarchal authoritarian society are 
interwoven. Without the inclusion of this institution, it is not 
possible to understand the sexual economy and the 
ideological process of a patriarchal society. The 
psychoanalysis of men and women of all ages, all countries, 
and every social class shows that: The interlacing of the 
socio economic structure with the sexual structure of society 
and the structural reproduction of society take place in the 
first four or five years and in the authoritarian family. The 
church only continues this function later. Thus, the 
authoritarian state gains an enormous interest in the 
authoritarian family: It becomes the factory in which the 
state’s structure and ideology are molded. (29-30) 
 
Reich’s point, which combines psychoanalysis and Marxist ideas, about 
the origins of fascist power, emphasizes the importance of the very early 
years of a child’s upbringing in an ‘authoritarian family’, or in other words, 
a family with a strong leader in the father and a loving mother who serve 
to reproduce a variety of traits such as sexual anxiety, obedience to 
authority and emotional dependence on a mother figure. These are the 
same traits that the Wild Boys rebel violently against and that Burroughs 
often ridicules in his texts. The Wild Boys are often described as young 
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men or boys who left their (authoritarian) family to join the group. It is no 
wonder that they eventually develop a way of reproducing through a 
ritual that requires no women, thus avoiding the traditional family 
structure altogether. It is ironic, however, that they shed this burden of an 
authoritarian family in favour of a remarkably violent brotherhood of 
fellow men. By doing this they arguably avoid what Reich theorized had 
been the catalyst of the rise of German fascism, but they substitute for 
the family an organisation that somewhat resembles a militaristic order 
that, even though it is not hierarchical, nonetheless requires total 
dedication and self-sacrifice. However, I will argue that their non-
hierarchical structure is what differentiates them from an authoritative 
military structure and imbues them with emancipatory, revolutionary 
force.           
 The Wild Boys are also the theoretical answer to the question: why 
does power, on the whole, insist on having its own (nuclear) destruction 
at its fingertips? And why does this not infuriate those who are not in 
such positions of power further? It seems as though even those who are 
in power, and presumably you and I too, are perfectly capable of finding 
our footing in a world that has come to seem, especially since the 
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, utterly ephemeral. Perhaps we find 
it easy to adjust to this state of being, because we are aware that in this 
way, humanity as a whole starts to mirror our own bodies, which have 
always been temporary. Especially in the secular age of postmodernity, 
and with the ever-present knowledge of the Holocaust, the atomic bomb 
and other “tsunami’s”, each in their own way manufactured by mankind 
and suffered by mankind. In the fictional universe of Burroughs’ novels, 
the Wild Boys try to resist the constant precariousness that comes into 
existence through the very invention of nuclear bombs and industrialized 
genocide by attempting to leave the human body behind, and in doing 
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so, curing themselves of the Human Virus. In Queer Burroughs, Jamie 
Russel asks: “After spending so much time fantasizing bodily autonomy, 
freedom from regulation, and a masculine identity, why should queer 
heroes want to leave their phallic, male bodies behind?” (157) To answer 
that question, I argue that leaving their bodies is the only answer they 
have to the immense potentiality that is humanity’s nuclear self-
destruction. The following quote from The Wild Boys is ironic, in this 
respect: “A highly placed narcotics official tells a grim President: “The 
wild-boy thing is a cult based on drugs, depravity and violence more 
dangerous than the hydrogen bomb. (151)”” In what way the Wild Boys 
could be more dangerous than the hydrogen bomb remains unclear, 
although it seems clear that the above quote is a parody of how 
conservative politics would’ve viewed the 1960’s countercultural forces of 
which Burroughs was a part, which were characterized by strong pacifist 
and anti-nuclear sentiments.  
 
VII. Conclusions 
Let tyranny reign for a single day, and on the morrow not one 
patriot will be left. How long will the despots' fury be called 
justice, and the people's justice barbarism or rebellion? How 
tender one is to the oppressors and how inexorable against 
the oppressed! (Robbespierre) 
 
Burroughs, along with many of the Beat- and hippie-generations, often 
protested in their own ways against the possibility of nuclear war; a 
threat which, as I would argue, came into existence through competing 
imperialist desires. The most well-known examples are the bombings of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but the United States used the threat of 
nuclear destruction in North Korea during the war they fought in the early 
1950’s too. The power guaranteed by having a monopoly over nuclear 
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bombing technology might’ve disappeared since then, but the technology 
itself is present underneath the surface of many of today’s large-scale 
diplomatic crises and negotiations, even if just in the form of accusations 
or suspicions. It is still the ultimate bargaining tool, akin to the Apple of 
Knowledge, between the God of the Old Testament and humanity as 
Adam and Eve: it is never to be used, or eaten, but this prohibition itself 
is a way of using, or eating from, it. The legitimacy of modern empires is 
sustained by the very possibility of imminent destruction of themselves 
and others: a barbarian threat, to be sure, and an unambiguously feared 
one at that. The fact that nuclear destruction is a theme that is navigated 
in the same novels that are also cut-up novels, novels about Wild Boys 
and multibillionaires, generals, mass-media and guerrilla warfare and the 
so-called Nova Mob is incentive enough for me to reread Burroughs’ 
work as an exploration not just of “systems of control”, but as proposals 
for radical change and a different future: “All out of time and into space. 
Come out of the time word “the” forever. Come out of the body word 
“thee” forever. There is no thing to fear. There is no thing in space. There 
is no word to fear. There is no word in space” (151, The Soft Machine). 
Burroughs hints at an existence outside of, or without, language and the 
body, the two being somehow connected, here. Elsewhere, he describes 
language as a virus, which resonates with the previous idea: if language 
is a virus affecting the body, one must leave both behind.  
 The trope of the barbarian as embodied by Burroughs’ Wild Boys is 
a utopian and avant-gardist mobilisation of a figure often invoked as 
agent of dystopian change. His Wild Boys are neither the first nor the last 
positive appropriation of this figure in the name of change, but they are a 
striking one. The aims of the group as a whole are difficult to grasp, and 
sometimes distinctly problematic, such as when they exclude women not 
only from their reproductive rituals but even from their afterlives in the 
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Western Lands. Any reading of their activities and aims cannot neglect 
this element, but we must also recognize the other objects of their ire: 
authoritarian family structures, which Reich claimed lay at the root of 
fascism; bureaucratic and military obedience, which lies at the root of the 
constant precariousness of “mutually assured destruction” and the 
continued existence of the nuclear bomb and the other elements that 
perpetuate the Human Virus as Burroughs posited it. Another element 
that makes the Wild Boys stand out even more when we read Burroughs’ 
work today is their similarity, on the surface, to modern day terrorists or 
extremists. A present-day reader knows that the Wild Boys cannot be 
references to modern extremists, but it is nonetheless startling to notice 
that the Wild Boys are not only guerrilla fighters who utilize hit-and-run 
tactics against a much larger and well-equipped force, but that they are 
also commonly described as fighting in the deserts of North Africa. In the 
end, therefore, the Wild Boys are a problematic, masculine, comical but 
violent force of change in Burroughs’ works. A reading which seeks to 
locate the emancipatory element within Burroughs’ texts solely in the 
Wild Boys might come to the conclusion that the latter are, in the end, 
too problematic and incommensurable with a just conception or idea of 
utopia. Even though they seem at times to be a successful force of 
emancipatory change, they only consist of teenage boys. This is, 
perhaps their most tragic element too, because it limits their true appeal 
to a very small percentage of human beings to the exclusion of so many. 
There is, however, one more thing I wish to discuss and that is 
Burroughs’ use of the cut-up as a prophetic tool, which I feel might 
redeem the texts from an emancipatory perspective. Dupuy explains 
prophecy as follows: 
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We would say today that the word of the prophet had a 
performative power: in saying things, he brought them into 
being. Mind you, the prophet was well aware of this. One 
might be tempted to conclude that the prophet had the power 
to which political revolutionaries aspire: he spoke so that 
things might change in the direction that he wished to 
impress upon them. But this would be to overlook the 
fatalistic aspect of prophecy, which reads out the names of 
all those things that will come to pass, just as they are written 
down on the great scroll of history, immutably, ineluctably. 
Thus Jeremiah(13:23): “Can the Ethiopian change his skin or 
the leopard his spots? Then may you also do good who are 
accustomed to do evil.” Evildoers, the biblical prophet says, 
are doomed forever to do evil. (Dupuy 32) 
 
It is this fatalistic aspect of prophecy that Burroughs’ texts challenge, 
through their cut-up form as well as through their content. The cut-up 
imperative resists fatalism by encouraging the reader to violate and alter 
the text. In this sense, the cut-up is anti-prophetic. But, at the same time, 
Burroughs presented the method as a prophetic one when he stated, as 
he commonly did: “cut-up the present and the future leaks out.” When 
the biblical prophet ascertains that “the Ethiopian” cannot “change his 
skin” nor “the leopard his spots,” it becomes clear that the prophet has 
not read about Burroughs’ Wild Boys, which take all sorts of forms and 
colors throughout the texts. And lastly, Burroughs’ texts sometimes have 
a prophetic aesthetic to them, for example when Uranium Willy orders us 
to “storm the Reality Studio.” The entire Wild Boy uprising arguably takes 
the form of a prophecy in this sense as well. This paradoxical quality of 
the texts, which through their use of the cut-up are anti-prophetic but 
nonetheless incorporate prophetic elements into their content, is perhaps 
one of the most remarkable things about them.    
 Whether or not cut-up text truly has some kind of prophetic powers, 
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as Burroughs sometimes claimed it did, I hope to have presented a 
convincing argument for why Burroughs’ cut-up novels are just as 
relevant today as they were 50 years ago. A war is no longer being 
fought in Vietnam, in fact, Vietnam is now quite a pleasant tourist-
destination, as I experienced recently. A war is, however, being fought in 
other parts of the world, a war which is often called the “War on Terror.” 
From within a Europe that has come to appear just as fractured as it was 
in the past, I write about barbarism and the Wild Boys from an 
emancipatory and a revolutionary perspective. Not in the hope that the 
“Middle East”, too, will be a pleasant tourist destination for the West in 50 
years, but in the hopes that the ouroboros that is empire (and perhaps 
humanity itself) might one day stop eating its own tail and look towards 
what lies ahead instead of what lies behind it.  
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